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I
ABSTRACT
This paper extends the approach to Congressional and regulatory institutions
developed by Shepsle and Weingast by introducing an ideologically motivated
Judiciary. The model yields empirically refutable implications which are then
tested in the framework of modeling the Court's industrial labor relations
decisions. Using information on politicians' ADA scores, the composition of
the Court, and the decisions of the Court, we obtain estimates of a) the
position of the Court in relation to the relevant members of Congress, and b)
the determinants of labor policy through the years. We find, first, that the
Court was constrained by Congress over at least half of the period. Second,
that a 10 points increase in the ADA rating of the relevant member of
Congress, or in the imputed ADA rating of the Supreme Court, increases the
probability of a pro-union decision by approximately 5 percentage points.
Third, that the imputed political preferences of the Court seem to be well
explained simply by its political composition. Finally, while parsimonious,
our model is a relatively good predictor of the Court's decisions, and
substantially superior to a simple political bargaining model without
institutional content. Our results, then, suggest that the Court responds,
albeit indirectly, to interest group pressures.
II
I. Introduction.
The importance of the Supreme Court in shaping public policy has long been
I recognized by scholars and politicians alike. The current academic debate concerning
what the role of the Supreme Court should be in our political system, however, has
been essentially normative, with little emphasis on the way the Court actually
interacts with the other institutions of our political system. Positive analyses of
the Court, furthermore, have usually focused on the Court decision making process in
isolation, without embedding it in a more general framework of political and
regulatory institutions. 1
This state of affairs contrasts drastically to the recent development of rational
choice theories of political and regulatory institutions (e.g., Congress, the
President and the administrative agencies) , that followed the basic ideas developed in
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), and that was further developed by the important
work of Weingast, Shepsle, and Noll, among others. 2 In this paper we expand this
framework by introducing the Supreme Court as a strategic player in the game among the
different political institutions. 3
1 See Rohde and Spaeth (1976), Sheldon (1974), Halpern and Lamb (1982) and Wasby
(1988) for surveys of the different approaches to the analysis of the Supreme Court.
Among the classic positive approaches to the Supreme Court is that of Dahl (1957), who
claims that, because of their recruitment, the Justices are a reflection of the
electorate, and they play a "legitimizing" role. Dahl's hypothesis is rooted in the
"decision-making" models of the Court (see Sheldon (1974)), where, as long as its
composition is given, the Court is essentially independent of the remaining parts of
the political system. Dahl's hypothesis was later expanded by Funston (1975). See
also Handberg and Hill (1980) and (1984) for a similar interpretation. An alternative
view of the Supreme Court is provided in Adamany (1973) , who claims that the Court
constitute a force for instability. See, also Casper (1976).
2 In particular, see Weingast and Marshall (1987), Shepsle and Weingast (1987)
and (1989), Weingast and Moran (1983), McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989).
3 We are not the first to have introduced the Court in a rational choice
framework, nor to have analyzed the Court in its interaction with the other political
institutions (see footnote 1). For example, Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast (1989)
have observed the important role of Court decisions in the regulatory process.
Our model of Court-Congress interaction is one where the Court is restricted in
its choices by the ability of Congress to overturn its decisions. The Court, then,
cannot deviate too much from what Congress' independent legislative outcome would be
without facing a reversal. 4 Thus, even though Congress may not be actively
legislating, it does not follow that Congress has actually relinquished legislative
responsibility to the Courts, or that the Court is dictatorial. The recent debate
about the welfare implications of "activist" or "restrained" Courts, is, in our
framework, inconsequential, as the same Court will find it optimal to be activist at
some point in times, and restrained in others. While our model is extremely simple,
we see it as an initial step towards a more general analytical framework. Furthermore,
even in its simplicity, our model has empirically refutable implications about the
determinants of public policy by the Supreme Court, which we test in the framework of
industrial labor relations.
Using information on politicians' ADA scores, the composition of the Court, and
the decisions of the Court, we obtain estimates of a) the position of the Court in
relation to the relevant members of Congress, and b) the determinants of labor policy
through the years. We find first, that the Court was constrained by Congress over at
least half of the period. Second, that a 10 points increase in the ADA rating of the
relevant member of Congress, or in the imputed ADA rating of the Supreme Court,
increases the probability of a pro-union decision by approximately 5 percentage
points. Third, that the imputed political preferences of the Court seem to be well
explained simply by its political composition. Finally, while parsimonious, our model
Similarly, in McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) the judiciary fulfills an important
role in policing the behavior of the regulatory agencies. Our framework is
particularly related to Marks (1987) who observed that the Court's choices are
restricted by the Congress' ability to overturn its decisions.
A We focus here on statutory decisions. For a rational choice framework to
constitutional decisions, see Gely and Spiller (1989b).
is a relatively good predictor of the Court's decisions, and substantially superior to
a simple political bargaining model without institutional content.
II. A Rational Choice Model of Supreme Court Decision Making. 5
Consider a single-dimensional policy issue. We claim below that labor relations
is such type of issue, as by its nature labor policy is either pro-union or pro-
management. 6 Consider also a legislature that is composed of two chambers, a House
and a Senate. We assume that each has well specified, and single peaked, preferences
over the issue in question, as depicted in Figure 1. The modern theory of
Congressional institutions (e.g. Weingast and Marshall (1988), Shepsle and Weingast
(1987, 1989)) suggests that committees have substantial power over the issues under
their jurisdiction. In particular, because they have both gate-keeping and veto power
(i.e. they may block legislation from being introduced, as well as kill or modify
legislation in conference), committee members' preferences will dominate issue
specific legislation. Furthermore, since committee membership is not random, but
rather is the result of a self -selection process (see Shepsle (1978) and Weingast and
Marshall (1987)), committees will tend to be relatively more homogeneous in their
issue -specific preferences than their respective chambers as a whole. Thus, our
assumption about legislators' preference is equivalent to assume full control of
legislature outcomes by the relevant committees. Seen in this light, these
assumptions may not drastically violate reality. 7
5 For a more detailed analysis of this framework, see Gely and Spiller (1989a).
6 That is, we are assuming that the purpose of government, or Court,
intervention is simply to redistribute bargaining power between management and the
union.
We plan to investigate the empirical implications of imperfect committee power
in future research.
In the absence of a Supreme Court, and for that matter of a President and/or
administrative agencies, the House and the Senate will bargain over the issue, and an
outcome (weakly) in between the ideal points of the two chambers should arise as an
equilibrium. 8 That is, bargaining between the House and the Senate will bring about a
legislative outcome, XL , in the contract set between the House and the Senate, as in
Figure l. 9
Introduce now the Supreme Court. We assume that the Court's preferences are also
well specified and single peaked over the policy issue in question. The source of the
Court's preferences, however, are different from those of the legislators. While
legislators "vote their district," 10 Supreme Court justices are not subject to
reelection. We assume, then, that the Court's preferences are essentially
ideologically based. 11 In our empirical case, the justices' view of the world is what
determine how pro-union or pro -management they are. Our assumption about the Court's
preferences is similar to assume that the Court is a single individual. This is not a
very drastic assumption as our assumption of single-dimensionality of the issue allows
8 The actual bargaining game played between the House and the Senate is
irrelevant. All what we assume is that the outcome will be Pareto efficient, and that
the bargaining process cannot make any player worse off as compared to the status quo.
9 Depending on the nature of the bargaining game being played, there may or not
exist a deterministic function relating the bargaining outcome to the ideal points of
the two chambers and to the initial status quo.
10 See Fiorina (1974), and Kalt and Zupan (1984), Kau and Rubin (1979), and
Peltzman (1984), for empirical tests of this proposition.
11 While the justices' monetary well-being may be unrelated to the issue in
question, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that they may have strong views
about the substance of the case. Members of the Court are not elected and thus are
not under direct constituency pressure. They are, however, appointed by elected
officials who do feel that pressure. Furthermore, political considerations form part
of the appointment process, making it important to consider the political preferences
of the justices. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of changes in
its composition, the Supreme Court has stable preferences over the policy space.
the working of the median voter theorem in the absence of agenda control. 12 Finally,
we assume that the Court is free to make its decisions on a continuum, rather than
just on a yes or no basis. 13
There are many ways of modeling the interaction between Congress and the Court.
We propose a simple bargaining framework consisting of two stages. In the first stage
the Court determines the status quo. The second stage consists of bargaining between
the two houses of Congress for an alternative policy outcome. 1 '1 The outcome of the
second stage is the final policy outcome. If the House and the Senate agree on an
alternative policy to that of the Court, then the Congressional decision becomes the
law. If, instead, Congress cannot agree on an alternative, then the Court's decision
becomes the law. We can then see that the equilibrium to this game has to be in the
contract set between the House and the Senate (i.e., in between their ideal points).
Since the Court anticipates the bargaining outcome arising from any feasible decision,
it will make its decision strategically, such that it will maximize its utility and
not being reversed. In other words, the Court will pick that point in the contract
set between the House and the Senate that maximizes its own utility. Would the
12 The relevant preference is, then, that of the median justice. If the
Justices care about precedent, however, the median voter theorem may fail. For an
analysis of such a case see Schwartz (1989). In our framework, however, in the
absence of uncertainty there is no role for precedent. For a detailed analysis and
description of the Court decision making process, see Spaeth (1979), and Woodward and
Armstrong (1979). Observe, also, that it could be the case that some extent of log-
rolling takes place among justices. In such a case, then, the revealed preferences of
the Court in a given case will not reflect their underlying preferences, but rather
the result of a more complex process.
13 There are several reasons why this assumption may be proper. First, the
Court is free to interpret in its own way each case that comes to it. Second, the
decision to grant cert allows the Court to choose that case that fits its preferred
outcome. Finally, it can use dicta to call for a particular type of case.
14 The Court's choice of the status quo serves, then, as the initial bargaining
point for the two houses of Congress. Observe, that since the bargaining outcome is
both efficient and cannot make any of the houses of Congress worse off than the status
quo, then the Court's decision sets limits to the set of feasible bargaining outcomes.
Supreme Court's decision be outside the contract set between the House and the Senate,
it would trigger a legislative bargaining process, with its outcome almost surely
being strictly inside the contract set. 15 Thus, if the ideal point of the Court is
outside the contract set, its optimal decision point is the closest boundary of the
contract set. Thus, its decision will not be reversed by Congress, and it will become
the law. 16 - 17
There are then three feasible types of equilibria, or regimes, according to the
relative positions of the ideal points of the House, the Senate and the Court (see
Figure 2). Regime 1, is when the ideal point of the Court is to the right of those of
the House and the Senate. Regime 2, is when the ideal point of the Court is to the
left of the House and the Senate, and Regime 3, is when the ideal point of the Court
is located between those of the two houses of Congress. The equilibrium in Regime 1,
E
x
in Figure 2, is given by the higher of the ideal points of the House and the
Senate. If the Court tries to implement a policy outcome to the right of the ideal
15 To see this, consider a Court's decision outside the contract set. Call that
point y=S+x, assume x>0 and S>H. Assuming symmetric utility functions, the outcome to
the bargaining game between the House and the Senate has to be in the set
[Max(S-x.H) , S] . For exposition assume S-x>H. That the outcome cannot be to the left
of S-x arises from the symmetry of the Senate's preferences and from the fact that the
bargaining cannot make the Senate worse off than the status quo, y=S+x. That it
cannot be more than S arises from the efficiency of the bargaining process. While S
is a feasible solution to the bargaining, observe, however, that the Senate's initial
offer would most certainly be S, while the House's initial offer would most certainly
be S-x. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the bargaining outcome to be less than S.
16 Observe that the equilibria with and without the Court are quite similar. In
both cases the equilibria are (weakly) in between the ideal points of the two houses
of Congress. With the Court, however, the nature of the bargaining game between the
House and the Senate is inconsequential, as the outcome is a function only of the
Court's preferences.
17 In previous papers (e.g. Gely and Spiller (1989a) we have made the technical
assumption that the Court dislikes being reversed by Congress. In the current set-up,
however, such an assumption is unnecessary, as the equilibrium to the game here
specified is the same independently of that assumption. For a discussion of that
issue, see Gely and Spiller (1989a).
points of the House and the Senate, it will be reversed. Thus, the point that
maximizes the Court's preferences is the higher of the two ideal points. Observe that
in this regime, the actual value of the lower of the two Congressional ideal points is
of little relevance. All that matters is the higher of the two. Marginal changes in
either the Court's preferences, or in the preferences of the house with the lower
ideal point do not change the equilibrium. As long as the three ideal points keep
their relative position, all that matters is the exact location of the higher of the
two congressional ideal points. Similarly the equilibrium in Regime 2, E2 , is given
by the lower of the two ideal points. Finally, the equilibrium in Regime 3, E 3 is
given by the position of the ideal point of the Supreme Court. In this case the Court
can actually implement its most preferred outcome. Since bargaining between the House
and the Senate cannot provide a Pareto superior point to the ideal point of the Court,
Congress will not be able to reverse it, and thus, it becomes the equilibrium to this
game
.
The Court, then, can be "activist" or "restrained" depending on its relative
position vis-a-vis the houses of Congress. In regime 3, for example, the Court
behaves in a "restrained" fashion. Marginal changes in the political circumstances
have no impact on the Court's decisions. The Court follows its own precedent. In
regimes 1 and 2, however, the Court is "activist." Marginal changes in the
composition of Congress are translated into changes in the Court's interpretation of
the law. The Court, then, does not follow its own precedent.
Comparative Statics
Our framework has several empirical implications for the determination of Court's
decisions. First, the composition of Congress and of its relevant committees matter.
Holding constant the preferences of the Court, marginal changes in the composition of
Congress will usually translate in marginal changes in Court's decisions (unless
Regime 3 is the relevant one). Second, holding constant the composition of Congress,
marginal changes in the preferences of the Court will translate in marginal changes in
its decisions as long as its preferences are not extreme (that is as long as regime 3
is the relevant one). Thus, it is not unreasonable to observe a conservative Court
taking relatively liberal decisions, and vice-versa. A conservative Court facing an
increasingly liberal Congress will have to adjust its decisions. Thus, the Court
"reads the election results." That is, it follows the election results as they
translate in changes in the composition of Congress and its committees.
In the next sections we explore these empirical implications for the case of the
Court's decisions concerning the implementation of the National Labor Relations Act.
III. A Brief History of Labor Relations Legislation.
In the middle of the New Deal period Congress enacted the National Labor
Relations Act. 18 The NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board, and charged it
with the authority to enforce the Act, in particular as it relates to Section 7 of the
Wagner Act, which provided employees with the right to form unions. 19 Section 8 of
the NLRA defines five types of unfair labor practices, which the NLRB was supposed to
enforce . 20
18 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
19 Section 7 of the Wagner Act declared "employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
20 Section 8(A)(1) prohibits any attempt by an employer to "interfere with,
restraint, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7".
Second, Section 8(A)(2) outlaws domination or interference with the formation and
administration of a labor organization. Section 8(A)(3) makes it an unfair labor
practice for employers to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment, on
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization". Section 8(A)(4) outlines the protection against dismissal or disparate
8
The NLRA was ineffective during the first two years. The NLRB was subject to an
extensive amount of injunction litigation designed to prevent the Board from
exercising its administrative mandate. In addition, the constitutionality of the Act
was in dubious grounds. 21 It was also not clear whether the NLRA would not be
rendered ineffective by a narrow reading by the Court. In particular, there was a
concern as to whether or not the law could be applied to the manufacturing industry. 22
In 1937 the Supreme Court put to rest any questions as to the power of Congress
to regulate labor relations. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . 23 the Court held
that manufacturing was commerce and as such Congress had the authority to regulate
it. 2A The Jones decision provided the necessary push for the implementation of the
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining. 25 From then on, the NLRB was in
business
.
It is generally believed that, at least until War World II, the NLRB was a
treatment of an employee who has filed charges against his employer under the Act, and
finally, Section 8(A)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse
to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees."
21 For example, a few months before the enactment of the NLRA, the Supreme
Court, in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. . 295 U.S. 495 (1935), invalidated a similar
federal statute. The Court held that the National Industrial Recovery Act constituted
an abuse of congressional power under the commerce clause. Also, in Carter v. Carter
Coal Company
.
298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Supreme Court raised additional questions over
the constitutionality of the NLRA by invalidating Congress' attempt to regulate labor
relations in the coal -mining industry through the Bituminous Coal Act of 1936.
22 In particular, a decision holding that "commerce succeeds manufacturing and
is not part of it" United States v. Knieht . 156 U.S. 12 (1894), would have seriously
limited the effectiveness of the Act.
23 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24 In addition the Court upheld the NLRA against challenges that the act violated
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
25 For a rational choice analysis of the 1937 change in the Supreme Court, see
Gely and Spiller (1989b).
"zealously prolabor agency." 26 Neither Congress, the President, nor the Court, seem
to have been particularly dissatisfied with the pro- labor bias of the NLRB. After
World War II, however, a republican controlled Congress pushed forward for an
amendment to the NLRA. In 1947, over the veto of President Truman, Congress enacted
the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act). 27 Although it did not
invalidate the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act introduced various new elements
designed to "balance" the pro- labor character of the original Act. 28,29
In 1959, Congress again intervened directly to regulate labor relations. This
time, however, the focus was on regulating internal union practices. The Labor
-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the Landrum- Griffin Act), 30 was enacted with
the purpose of protecting union members from improper union conduct. The focus seems
to have been on the protection of the workers' constitutional rights while in the
work-place
.
Congress' legislative action on the labor relations front has been sporadic.
Following the passage of the NLRA, there were just two amendments to the Act. Apart
from the legislative hearings involved in the passage of these two pieces of
legislation, there does not seem to have been other important legislative action
concerning labor relations. While there were many hearings on the NLRB, most of them
26 See for example Moe (1985), p. 1096.
27 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Congress, 1st. Sess.,
(1947).
28 First, Section 8(B) of the new Act defined six new union unfair labor
practices. Second, Section 14(b) outlawed closed shops (an arrangement providing for
union membership as a condition for employment). Third, Section 8(c) established the
employer's right of free speech, under which the employer's right to express his view
during an organizing campaign was assured. Finally, the Act provided for the safeguard
of certain individual employee freedoms in their dealings with labor organizations.
29 See Delaney et al . for a survey of research on the NLRA.
30 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
10
dealt with the Board's load, more than with the Court's decisions. However, as Table
1 depicts, since World War II there have been substantial changes in the composition
of Congress, as well as in the tendency of the Court to support the unions. The
theory we presented in the previous section suggests that the lack of Congressional
activity should reflect that the Court was not pursuing a labor relations policy too
different from what the different Congress would have liked to see. In other words,
the change in the Court's tendency to support the unions and in the composition of
Congress must not be unrelated events.
IV. An Econometric Model of Supreme Court Labor Decisions.
In this section we explore the determinants of the Supreme Court labor relations
decisions. What we are interesting in explaining is the movement over time on the
pro-union bias on the Court's decision. Thus, our measure of policy outcome is the
percentage of pro-union decisions in a given year. The model developed in section II
assumes that we can locate the ideal points of the House, the Senate and the Court on
the policy line. It is reasonable to assume that there is a one-to-one relationship
between an individual's pro-union bias and her most preferred percentage of pro-union
Supreme Court decisions. Let that relationship be given by:
E£ = 7 + <**Pi + *i (1)
where P
t
reflects her pro-union bias, 7 and a are parameters, with q>0
,
and e i
representing an error term. Then, the discussion of section II implies that the
equilibrium value of the Supreme Court decision, E, namely how pro-union its decision
is, will then be given by
Regime 1: Et - 7 + a*Max(Ht ,S t ) + e t o SC t > Max(Ht ,S t ) (2a)
Regime 2: Et - 7 + a*Min(H t , S t ) + e t o SC t < Min(Ht ,S t ) (2b)
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Regime 3: Et - 7 + a*SC t + e t
Min(Htl S t ) < SCt < Min(Ht ,S t ) (2c)
where e t is distributed N(0,cr
2 ), t-l,T. 31
If we could measure perfectly the preferences of the Court, the House and the
Senate, then (2a) -(2c) would represent a three-regime-switching-regressions model with
known separation criteria. In our case, however, while we do have some information
about the pro-union tendencies of members of Congress, we do not have such information
for the Court.
We model the preferences of the court as a latent variable in the same dimension
that we measure pro-union biases for the House and the Senate. Let SC t be given by
SC t - XJ + Mt . • (3)
with nt being distributed N(0,ct2 ).
32 Since we do not observe perfectly the location
of the Supreme Court, equations (2) and (3) imply a switching-regimes model with
unknown separation criteria. Equations (2) and (3), however, imply that the
probability of observing regime 1, £ lt is given by:
£ lt - Prob(Regime 1) = Prob(SCt > Max(Ht ,S t ))
- l-$[(Max(S t ,Ht)-X^)/aJ, (4a)
where $(
.
) represents the standard normal distribution function.
Similarly, the probability of observing regime 2, £2 , is given by
£2t - *[<Mln(St ,Ht)-Xt0)/a|J. (4b)
Finally, the probability of observing regime 3, £ 3 , is simply
£ 3t - *[(Max(S fc ,Ht)-Xtj3)/aJ - *[ (Min(St ,Ht ) -X^/aJ . (4c)
31 If our measures of pro-union preferences were in the exact scale as pro-union
support , then 7-O and a-1
.
32 Our econometric modeling of the Court's preferences and decisions is similar
to that of Ashenfelter and Bloom's (1984) modeling of labor arbitrator's preferences
and decisions. In both cases the structural estimation of the decision maker's
preferences is required.
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(
The likelihood function of the model (2) -(4), is then given by
T
|
L - n (£ lt**! + £ 2t*^ 2 + £ 3t** 3 ) (5)
t=l
where
<f> 1
- l/a*^((Et - 7 - a*Max(Ht ,S t ))/a),
4>z
= l/<7**((E t - 7 - a*Min(Ht ,S t )/a),
and
03 = l/i(aVy)^((E t - 7 - ^X^/yCa 2*^^2 )).
with <(>(.) representing the standard normal density function. Expression (5) can be
estimated by standard maximum likelihood techniques. Our assumptions concerning the
distribution of e and /x, assure us that the parameters of the model are identifiable.
The econometric model (l)-(5) provides several ways of testing our theory of the
Supreme Court. First, if the model is true, then equations (2) -(4) imply that a
linear regression of Supreme Court decisions on preferences of the House and Senate is
misspecified. For some observations, only the preferences of the House matter, for
others only those of Senate, and in other cases only those of the Supreme Court
matter. Thus, such a linear regression should provide not only a worse fit than the
one obtained from estimating (l)-(4), but also the standard errors of the coefficients
of the variables representing the preferences of the House, Senate and the Court
should be relatively large. Second, our model implies that all the coefficients a i
should be positive. Finally, in each regime, given the preferences of the relevant
players, no other variables should impact upon the decision of the Court. That is,
assume that the preferences of the Court are more pro-union than those of the House,
and in turn those are more pro -union than those of the Senate. Then, only the
preferences of the House matter. Furthermore, no other macroeconomic or political
circumstance should matter, as those are already reflected in the revealed preferences
13
of the politicians that compose the House.
V. The Empirical Implementation.
The Data
To estimate our model we need three pieces of information: 1) Supreme Court
decisions, 2) measures of Congressional preferences, and 3) proxies for Supreme Court
preferences
.
We collected all Supreme Court decisions since 1949 that dealt with the
interpretation of the NLRA. 33 We found 171 Court cases that were granted certiorari
and that the Court has also acted upon. Each decision, in turn, was categorized
according to whether or, not it was a pro-union decision. We then computed, for each
year, the percentage of pro -union decisions. The first column of Table 1 presents the
result of that calculation. The performance of the different courts since 1949 is
presented in Table 2.
To measure the preferences of the House and the Senate, we use the ADA scores for
the Chairs of the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over the labor
relations. 3A Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 present the values of the ADA scores for the
relevant committee chairs.
Finally, as proxies for the preferences of the Supreme Court we use the
percentage of democrats in the Court (Table 1, column 5). Since the Court may also
respond to changes in the economic climate in considering whether to grant a pro -union
decision, we use inflation and the civilian rate of unemployment as proxies for macro-
33 We chose 1949 as our starting point as before 1949 there were several years
with no Supreme Court decisions taken.
3A We chose the ADA scores instead of the more directly relevant COPE scores
because while the ADA scores are available for the beginning of our time period, COPE [
scores are available only since the mid-1950s. The correlation between the two
measures, however, are higher than 90%.
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economic circumstances. Also, since the Court may be subject to influence from the
President, we let the preferences of the court be a function of whether the current
President is a democrat or not.
Empirical Results
Table 3 presents simple ols estimates of a model explaining the percentage of
pro-union decisions by the Court as a function of the House and Senate Committee
Chair's ADA ratings (HADACH and SADACH, respectively), a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for Democratic Presidents, the share of democrats in the Supreme Court, SCPOL,
the level of inflation and unemployment. The Nash solution to a bargaining game
between Congress and the Court, with no institutional structure, implies that the
bargaining outcome is a linear combination of the three ideal points of the House, the
Senate and the Court. Thus, a linear regression of Court's decisions on the measures
of Congressional pro-union preferences and of proxies for Court's preferences is the
empirical representation of the Nash-bargaining solution concept.
Overall, the results are quite poor. While the preferences of the Chair of the
House Labor committee seem to have an impact, no variable plays an important role.
Tables 4 and 5, however, show quite a different picture. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 4 present the estimation of the model (l)-(4) assuming that we have absolutely
no information about the Court's preferences. 35 That is, we model the Court's
preferences as a constant plus an error term with mean zero and variance o*. Column
1 assumes that the parameters of equation (1) are the same across regimes, while in
Column 2 those parameters are allowed to differ. The results of these two columns
suggest that there is a positive, albeit declining, relationship between the most
preferred policy outcome and our measure of pro-union support. At higher levels of
35 All estimations were performed using the GQOPT subroutine. Several starting
values were tried to be sure of obtaining a global maximum.
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pro-union support, however, there does not seem to be a relationship between pro-union
support and percentage of pro-union decisions. A comparison of Column 2 and any of
the ols regressions in Table 3 suggest that a three regime model fits the data better
than a Nash-bargaining model. For example, the first two columns of Table 4 have as
independent variables only functions of the Senate and the House Chairs' ADA ratings,
with the same variables appearing in Column 3 of Table 3. The Akaike Information
Criteria implies that the model of Column 2, Table 4, should be preferred over that of
Column 3, Table 3
.
36 Furthermore, the effect of politics and the Court's preferences
on the determination the Court's percentage of pro-union labor decisions is quite
important. For example, on average, a 10 point increase in the relevant congressional
or Court imputed ADA ratings increases the percentage of pro-union decisions by 7
percentage points (Column 1, Table 4). Since the average imputed ADA rating for the
Court is between 45 and 60, then the elasticity of judicial decisions with respect to
both court preferences and political influence is almost 1. Thus, political
preferences of both the Court and Congress do have an impact on the judicial decisions
of the Court.
The third column of Table 4 explores the role of the political composition of the
Court in the determination of its imputed pro-union preferences. Here we let the
preferences of the Court be a linear function of its political composition, namely, of
the proportion of Justices that were Democrats at time of their appointment to the
Court. Comparing Columns 1 and 3 we find that the political composition of the Court
is an important determinant of its imputed political preferences. Not only an
increase in its democratic composition increases its imputed ADA rating, but at the
average value of the variables, the elasticity of its imputed ADA ratings with respect
to its composition is approximately 3. Furthermore, it seems that the composition of
36 Their respective AIC are -12.934 and -13.627
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)the Court is quite a good indicator of regime switching. In particular, observe that
while the point estimate of a^ is relatively large, its standard error is even larger.
Using the test developed in Gourieroux, et al (1982), we cannot reject that the
variance of SC in (3) is zero. 37 Column 4 shows the result of estimating the same
model imposing the a =0 constraint. Neither the point estimates of the parameters nor
the value of the log likelihood change much from imposing the restriction, suggesting
that the political composition of the Court allows us to discriminate quite well among
the different regimes.
Table 5 explores the determinants of the Court's preferences in more detail. 38
Strictly for comparison purposes, column 1 replicates the results of column 1 in Table
4 assuming a -1 . Column 2 explores whether the preferences of the Court are a
function of macro -economic circumstances as well as whether they are influenced by the
President. In this column we restrict all parameters in equation (1) to be the same
across regimes. That is, we impose the constraints that j i and a L are the same across
all regimes. None of the macroeconomic conditions seem to affect the pro-union bias
of the Court. Observe, furthermore, that the hypothesis that the three variables are
jointly statistically significant can be rejected at more than the standard confidence
levels. Column 3 explores whether, given the ADA scores of the relevant members of
congress, and the imputed values for the Court, the macro-economic conditions and the
37 Since a• is non-negative, standard log- likelihood tests are inappropriate.
Instead, Gourieroux, et al (1982) show that 2(LUR -LR ) is asymptotically distributed as
(x2 (0)+x2 (l))/2, with the critical region at level a obtained from P(Z>c)-=2q, where Z
has a ^(l). Using this criteria, the restriction o^-O cannot be rejected as 2(LUR -
LR ) equals .244, less than critical values at any standard significance levels.
All estimates in Table 5 are obtained assuming a -1 . These estimates are
preferred because the assumption of a^-0 is quite extreme, and for some of the
specifications the estimated standard errors of the parameters of the SC function were
extremely small. See, for example, the unusual standard errors of the point estimates
I of fi 1 and /32 in column 4 Table 4. Overall the values of the log likelihood were
approximately equal, usually differing by ±.01 to ±.04.
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president have any effect on the percentage of pro-union decisions. Failure to reject
this hypothesis would raise the question of whether the ADA ratings are actually
measuring properly the pro-union tendencies of the relevant members of Congress. This |
hypothesis, however, is also soundly rejected. 39 Finally, Column 4 explores whether
it is proper to assume that a's and 7's of equation (1) are the same across regimes,
given that the Court' political preferences are a function of all the macroeconomic
and political variables. That is, whether the function relating ADA ratings to
preferred Supreme Court mix of pro-union decisions is linear over the whole range of
ADA values. Comparing columns 1 and 4 we can see that, as in Table 4, the restriction
that all coefficients are alike across regimes is rejected at more than the 1%
confidence level. 40 Column 4 supports our framework. Increases in the relevant ADA
scores in regimes 2 and 3 imply significant increases in the predicted percentage of
pro-union decisions (of 1 or 2 percentage points). On the other hand, a similar
increase in regime 1 implies a statistically insignificant reduction in the predicted
percentage of pro-union decisions of approximately half a percentage point. While
this result could reflect a non-linear relationship between preferred pro-union mix
and ADA ratings, it could also be the result of potential model misspecification. We
discuss this issue in the next section.
To summarize, our results suggest that modeling the Court as a totally
unconstrained institution or as an institution that makes decisions exclusively based
on legal precedent is inappropriate. Congress' preferences matter. Perhaps the most
surprising result is that the way Congressional interests matter are consistent with
the predictions of the model developed above. That is, the constraints faced by the
39 Observe, however, that now the Court seems to be more pro -union when facing a
democratic president.
40
X
2
. i(^)-13.28<2*(Log likelihood ratio)-20. 74.
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Court vary across the different regimes, with only one house of Congress becoming the
relevant constraint (if at all) at each point in time.
The results we just presented have several implications for the understanding of
the behavior of the Court. First, using the results of column 4, Table 5, we find
that the Court was free to make decisions based only on its own preferences 50% of the
times, while 20% of the times it was constrained by a conservative committee chair,
and 30% of the times by a liberal committee chair. See Figures 3 and 4. Second, our
model seems to explain the behavior of the Court quite well. For example, using the
imputed ADA ratings from Table 5 we can calculate the share of the variance that is
explained by the model. They are reported in Table 5 as the R- squared of the model.
The model in Column 4, Table 5, seems to fit the data quite well, as it explains 49%
of the variance of the dependent variable. The models presented in Table 4, however,
explain at most 14% of the variance.
VI. Extensions and Final Comments.
In this paper we extend the modern theory of Congressional institutions to
account for an independent judiciary. Our current model, however, is quite simple,
and it could be extended in several directions. First, the model in this paper is a
single period model. The Justices, as well as Congress, are assumed to make their
decisions based exclusively on the current political situation. While this is a
useful methodological assumption, it is not unreasonable to think, however, that at
least the Justices have a longer horizon into account, and that their decisions may
not be affected so much by temporary political considerations. This would suggest
that the relevant constraints on the Justices are not the current political
composition of Congress, but its expected future composition. Second, in our model
there is no role for either the President or the Agency. The fact that we find that
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the pro-union preferences of the Court increase when facing a Democrat as President
may suggest that the Court may actually defer, to some extent, to the NLRB. Modeling
the interaction between the Court and the agency should provide an answer to this
question. Third, we assume that committees have total control over the legislative
outcome, that is, that only the preferences of the committee chairs are relevant. If
committees did not have full control, then the set of feasible judicial decisions will
be larger than the one we use in this paper, as it will take into account the relative
position of the median voters of each house. A1 Consequently, we will be wrongly
classifying regimes, and this may actually explain the negative, albeit insignificant,
coefficient of the Chair ADA rating for regime 1 obtained in Column 4, Table 5.
Finally, we assume that the Court does not care about reversing itself. While the
Court has on several occasions reversed itself, it is reasonable to presume that
Justices may actually dislike such reversals as they may reduce the legitimacy of the
institution. Modeling the cost of reversing prior decisions may improve our
understanding of the determinants of the Court's decisions. We plan to consider some
of these extensions in future research.
While derived from a simple theoretical framework, however, our empirical results
show the potential usefulness of a rational choice theory of the Courts, as they raise
questions about the belief on a truly independent judiciary, following the rules of
precedent without regard to the political considerations of the times or to its own
political preferences. Instead, we find that the Court seems to make its decisions so
as to maximize its (ideologically based) preferences, taking into account the relevant
political constraints. Furthermore, we find that half of the times the Court was
actually constrained by the political composition of Congress. Also, when the Court
was free to decide based only on its own political preferences (mostly in the 1960s
41 See, Spiller (1989).
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and 1980s), Congress seems to have been quite at odds on what labor relations policy
should be, hence it would have been illusory to expect Congress to have formulated a
radically different labor policy. Finally, the results in this paper provide further
support to the basic idea of the economic theory of regulation (e.g. Stigler (1971)),
as not only Congress responds to interest group pressure, but so does the Court.
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TABLE 1
Year Perct. House Senate Pres. Perct.
Pro Comm Comm Dem Democratic
Union Chair ADA Chair ADA Justices
1949 0.25 38 93 1 88.88
1950 0.66 6 80 1 88.88
1951 0.40 8 66 1 88.88
1952 0.00 71 1 88.88
1953 0.50 27 40 77.77
1954 0.66 11 38 77.77
1955 0.50 20 70 66.66
1956 0.57 14 71 66.66
1957 0.72 58 55.55
1958 0.20 67 55.55
1959 1.00 54 55.55
1960 0.71 11 17 55.55
1961 1.00 100 80 1 55.55
1962 1.00 87 17 1 66.66
1963 0.57 100 44 1 66.66
1964 1.00 100 11 1 66.66
1965 0.67 84 12 1 66.66
1966 1.00 88 10 1 66.66
1967 1.00 73 15 1 66.66
1968 0.50 57 13 66.66
1969 1.00 40 78 66.66
1970 0.00 49 65 55.55
1971 0.50 57 93 55.55
1972 0.50 59 87 55.55
1973 0.33 60 80 55.55
1974 0.40 43 90 55.55
1975 0.75 58 89 44.44
1976 1.00 60 85 1 44.44
1977 0.00 40 85 1 44.44
1978 0.40 45 80 1 44.44
1979 0.60 58 74 1 44.44
1980 0.33 59 77 44.44
1981 0.75 60 44.44
1982 0.67 70 5 44.44
1983 0.33 85 8 44.44
1984 0.00 75 8 44.44
1985 0.67 85 10 44.44
1986 0.00 85 5 44.44
1987 1.00 85 95 33.33
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF PRO-UNION DECISIONS
BY COURT 1949 TO PRESENT
COURT PERCENTAGE
Vinson 50%
(1946-1952)
Warren 73
(1953-1969)
Burger 70
(1969-1985)
Rehnquist 50
(1985-1987)
TABLE 3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCENTAGE OF PRO-UNION SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
YEARS: 1949 - 1987
METHOD: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
VARIABLE I II III
Constant .434 1.166 .475
(1.14) (1.83) (3.02)
HADACH .002 .002 .002
(.88) (.83) (1.26)
SADACH -.00 -.00 -.00
(-.32) (-.19) (-.24)
DEM PRESIDENT .08 .106
(.62) (.79)
SCPOL .000 -.006
(.10) (-.92)
INFLATION -.02
(-.96)
UNEMPLOYMENT -.051
(-1.15)
R- SQUARED .075 .134 .057
DURBIN -WATSON 2.13 2.22 2.10
LOG LIKELIHOOD -9.24 -7.95 -9.617
TABLE 4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCENTAGE OF PRO-UNION SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
YEARS: 1949 - 1987
METHOD: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
PARAMETER VARIABLE I II III IV
Pi CONSTANT 45.68 58.11 -129.55 -129.00
(5.22) (9.57) (-1.27) (-103.22)
02 SCPOL 3.27 3.25
(1.90) (144.71)
7i CONSTANT .203* .69 .288 .286
Regime 1 (.77) (5.55) (1.74) (2.33)
Q i ADA SCORE .007 -.001 .005 .005
Regime 1 (1.50) (-.54) (1.95) (2.50)
7 2 CONSTANT -1.103
Regime 2 (-3.91) -- --
a 2 ADA SCORE — .025
Regime 2 (6.61) -- --
7 3 CONSTANT -.91
Regime 3 (-1.25) --
Q
3 ADA SCORE .025 _ _
Regime 3 -- (2.18) -- --
a .299 .099 .293 .296
(6.41) (3.84) (8.59) (8.83)
a
M 12.82 12.84 9.78 0.00*
(1.08) (2.30) (.50)
LOG LIKELIHOOD -9.701 -3.934 -7.739 -7.861
Note: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses
Column 4 is estimated assuming a -0.
* 7j-7i. Oj-or!, for j-2,3.
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TABLE 5
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCENTAGE OF PRO-UNION SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
YEARS: 1949 - 1987
METHOD: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
fix
fiz
fit
7i
h
*i
72
7 3
(<V-D
VARIABLE I II III IV
CONSTANT 120. 08 -161.39 -120.45 -60.47
(-1 .99) (-1.04) (-1.53) (-1.60)
SCPOL 3. 13 3.32 2.78 1.71
(3 • 19) (1.99) (3.43) (4.30)
UNEMPLOYMENT 4.31 -.58 -1.32
(.40) (-.09) (-.73)
INFLATION .92 2.95 2.51
(.20) (1.59) (1.32)
DEM PRES 17.79 21.74 14.71
-- (1.17) (2.51) (2.63)
CONSTANT 27 .25 .08 .78
REGIME 1 (1 .81) (1.51) (.29) (3.66)
ADA SCORE 005 .005 .007 -.005
REGIME 1 (2 .20) (2.16) (2.53) (-1.63)
UNEMPLOYMENT .03
ALL REGIMES -- (1.07) --
INFLATION -.01
ALL REGIMES (-.93) --
DEM PRES -.07
ALL REGIMES -- -- (-.62)
CONSTANT _ _ -.77
REGIME 2 -- -- -- (-2.38)
ADA SCORE .022
REGIME 2 -- -- -- (4.11)
CONSTANT .23
REGIME 3 -- -- (1.61)
ADA SCORE .01
REGIME 3 -- -- -- (3.45)
.296 .294 .288 .226
(8 .83) (8.83) (8.83) (8.82)
[HOOD -7 .851 -7.654 -6.816 2.523
.14 .15 .18 .49R- Squared
Note: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
FIGURE 1
REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCES
ON THE PRO-UNION LINE
CONTRACT CURUE
BETWEEN H AND S
«I 7 s V
"PRO-UNION
FIGURE 2
SINGLE DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATION
REGIME 2 REGIME 3 REGIME 1
SC
2
SC
2
E
S SC
1
E
1
oo
o
I
I
I
<
<
<
X
CO
CO
ID
TOm
o
o
TO
o
o
"DO
CO
o
o
>
CO
o
o
m
CO
"0
7Q
m
o
o
70
O
O
>
o
o
O
CO
o
>
"D
cz
>
5
No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
No. 10
No. 11
No. 12
No. 13
No. 14
No. 15
No. 1 Susan I. Cohen. "Fareto Optimality and Bidding for Contracts" Working Paper # 1411
No. 2 Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee. "Spatially-Limited Altruism, Mixed Clubs, and Local Income
Redistribution" Working Paper #1406
No. 3 George E. Monahan and Vijay K. Vemuri. "Monotonicity of Second-Best Optimal Contracts" Working
Paper #1417
No. 4 Charles D. Kolstad, Gary V. Johnson, and Thomas S. Ulen. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante
Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?" Working Paper #1419
No. 5 Lanny Arvan and Hadi S. Esfahani. "A Model of Efficiency Wages as a Signal of Firm Value" Working
Paper #1424
No. 6 Kalyan Chatterjee and Larry Samuelson. "Perfect Equilibria in Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining"
Working Paper #1425
Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee. "Economies of Scope and Multiproduct Clubs" Working Paper #1428
Pablo T. Spiller. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency
Theory of Regulation (or "Let Them Be Bribed" Working Paper #1436
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Asymmetric Information, 'Interim' Equilibrium and Mechanism Design" Working
Paper #1437
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Mechanisms with No Regret: Welfare Economics and Information Reconsidered"
Working Paper #1438
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Communication Requirements and Strategic Mechanisms for Market
Organization" Working Paper #1439
Susan I. Cohen and Martin Loeb. "On the Optimality of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of
Joint Costs" Working Paper #1445
Susan I. Cohen and Martin Loeb. "The Demand for Cost Allocations: The Case of Incentive Contracts
Versus Fixed-Price Contracts" Working Paper #1455
Jan K. Brueckner and Kevin M. O'Brien. "Modeling Government Behavior in Collective Bargaining:
A Test for Self-interested Bureaucrats" Working Paper #1481
Jan K. Brueckner. "Estimating a Bargaining Contract Curve: Prior Restrictions and Methodology"
Working Paper #1490
No. 16 Peter C. Reiss and Pablo T. Spiller. "Competiton and Entry in Small Airline Markets" Working
Paper #1497
Pablo T. Spiller. "A Note on Pricing of Hub-and-Spoke Networks" Working Paper #1498
Larry DeBrock. "Joint Marketing Efforts and Pricing Behavior" Working Paper #1500
Frank A. Wolak and Charles D. Kolstad. "A Model of Homogenous Input Demand Under Price
Uncertainty" Working Paper #1502
Susan I. Cohen. "Reputation, Intertemporal Incentives and Contracting" Working Paper #1511
Lanny Arvan and Antonio Leite. "A Sequential Equilibrium Model of Cost Overruns in Long Term
Projects" Working paper #1514
Jan K. Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller. "Competiton and Mergers in Airline Networks" Working
Paper #1523
Hadi S. Esfahani. "Reputation, Product Quality, and Production Technology in LDC Markets"
Working Paper #89-1525
No. 24 Hadi S. Esfahani. "Moral Hazard, Limited Entry Costs, and 'Introductory Offers'" Working Paper
#89-1526
No. 25 Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Mechanisms with No Regret: Welfare Economics and Information
Reconsidered" Working Paper #89-1527
No. 26 Susan I. Cohen. "Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts" Working Paper #89-1558
No. 27 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "A Rational Choice Theory of the Supreme Court" Working Paper
#89-1559
No. 28 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "An Economic Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions The
State Farm and Grove City Cases" Working Paper #89-1560
No. 29 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional
Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan" Working Paper #89-1561
No. 30 Hadi S. Esfahani. "Reputation and Product Quality Revisited." Working Paper #89-1584
No. 31 Jan K. Brueckner. "Growth Controls and Land Values in an Open City." Working Paper #89-1594
No. 32 Jan K. Brueckner. "Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods." Working Paper #89-1610
No. 33 Luis Cabral and Shane Greenstein. "Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement
of Computer Systems." Working Paper #90-1628
No. 34 Charles D. Kolstad. "Hotelling Rents in Hotelling Space: Exhaustible Resource Rents with
Product Differentiation." Working Paper #90-1629
No. 17
No. 18
No. 19
Ho. 20
No. 21
No. 22
No. 23
I


HECKMAN IXl
ilNDERY INC. |M|
JUN95
nd -To-PWa^ N. MANCHESTER.
INDIANA 46962

